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INTRODUCTION: A DISASTROUS SITUATION

Louisiana is a hotbed for insurance claims because of both its high
automobile-accident rate⎯1,790 severe and fatal crashes in 20181––and
its high risk for property damage from natural disasters, such as hurricanes
and flooding.2 High rates of property and automobile damage lead to a
larger quantity of insurance claims, which in turn lead to more instances
of and claims against insurance companies for behavior that is knowing,
arbitrary, capricious, or lacking probable cause.3 Insurance companies
often rely on independent adjusters to promptly and properly investigate,
adjust, and settle insurance claims.4 Thus, the determination of whether
1. Louisiana SHSP Crash Dashboard, CTR. FOR ANALYTICS & RES. IN
TRANSP. SAFETY, http://datareports.lsu.edu/SHSPCrash.aspx (last visited June
16, 2020) (select “2018” from the year drop-down menu to view crash statistics
for 2018) [https://perma.cc/TD6L-H6TZ].
2. See Dean A. Sutherland, Insurance “Bad Faith” Law After Hurricanes:
Duties Owed by Insurance Companies and Potential Penalties for Violation of
Those Duties, 54 LA. BAR JNL. 90, 90 (2006).
3. Insurance Handbook, Spotlight On: Catastrophes - insurance issues, INS.
INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/publications/insurance-handbook/insurance-anddisasters/spotlight-on-catastrophes-insurance-issues (last visited Sept. 26, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/4F8C-9NEE]. Bad faith claims against insurers are those claims
providing penalties for insurers investigating and paying insurance claims in such
a way that is arbitrary, capricious, or lacking probable cause. See LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 22:1973, 22:1892 (2019).
4. See generally La Louisiane Bakery Co. v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 61 So. 3d
17 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011) (discussing an insurance company that hired an
independent adjuster to handle wind-damage claim after Hurricane Katrina);
Leslie Scism, Irma’s Riches: $30,000 for a Few Days of Work, WALL STREET J.
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insurers may be liable for the acts or omissions of independent adjusters is
vital to Louisiana’s insurance industry⎯especially in times of natural
disaster when there are a large number of claims.5
For example, in 2005 Hurricane Katrina devastated Louisiana and left
absolute destruction in its wake.6 Insurance companies faced an
unprecedented amount of property damage claims, and some insurers
hired independent adjusters to assist in the evaluation of claims and to
meet the increased demand.7 This system of insurers hiring independent
adjusters traditionally involves an independent adjuster evaluating the
claim and providing the insurer with satisfactory proof of loss, with the
insurer paying the claim to the insured within the statutorily-required time
period or facing liability for a failure to do so.8 The relationship between
insurers and hired adjusters raises two important questions: What would
happen if the independent adjuster received satisfactory proof of loss but
never provided that proof to the insurer or notified them to pay the claim?
Should courts impute liability for an independent adjuster’s acts or
omissions to the insurer when the insurer was completely diligent and not
knowing, arbitrary, capricious, without probable cause, or negligent in its
selection of the independent adjuster and monitoring of the claim?9 The
answers to these questions have colossal impacts on the insurance industry
in Louisiana.10 Not only do the answers determine whom the insured may
sue when the claims process goes awry, but they also determine whether

(Sept. 14, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irmas-riches-30-000for-a-few-days-of-work-1505381404 (“[A] friend, who happens to own an
independent adjusting firm, is desperately recruiting help.”) [https://perma.cc/
FQ72-DD37].
5. See Spotlight On: Catastrophes – insurance issues, supra note 3.
6. See Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06-618, 2006 WL
3313721, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006).
7. See generally La Louisiane Bakery Co., 61 So. 3d at 17 (discussing an
insurance company that hired an independent adjuster to handle wind-damage
claim after Hurricane Katrina); see Scism, supra note 4 (“[A] friend, who happens
to own an independent adjusting firm, is desperately recruiting help.”).
8. See generally La Louisiane Bakery Co., 61 So. 3d at 17 (discussing an
insurance company that hired an independent adjuster to handle wind-damage
claim after Hurricane Katrina).
9. The facts above are derivative of those in Pelican Hospitality Group v.
United National Insurance Co., a 2006 case from the Eastern District of
Louisiana. Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL 3313721, at *1.
10. See generally 1 STEVEN PLITT & JORDAN ROSS PLITT, PRACTICAL TOOLS
FOR HANDLING INSURANCE CASES § 7:41, Westlaw HANDINS (database updated
June 2019) (discussing independent-adjuster liability).
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insurance companies should face penalties and attorney’s fees for actions
they did not commit.11
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:1973 and § 22:1892 recognize that
insurance companies owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to their
insureds.12 Additionally, the statutes authorize penalties when insurers
knowingly perform various activities13 or when their failure to pay timely
or to make written settlement offers is “arbitrary, capricious, or without
probable cause.”14 Hiring independent adjusters complicates this liability
scheme, as it leaves much unclear, such as whether insurers can delegate
their statutory duties to independent adjusters, whether such adjusters owe
any duty to insureds, and whether independent adjusters are considered
independent contractors for liability purposes.15
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether courts should impute
liability from independent adjusters to the insurers that hired them hinges
upon the answer to three subquestions: (1) whether independent adjusters
owe a duty to insureds;16 (2) whether the law of agency provides for
vicarious liability of insurance companies based on their independent
adjusters;17 and (3) whether policy considerations support or oppose the
imputation of liability from independent adjusters to insurance
companies.18
To dispel the confusion among Louisiana courts’ treatment of
independent adjusters, Louisiana should adopt a statute encompassing a
balanced approach to whether independent adjusters owe an independent
11. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892 (2019).
12. Id.
13. For example, under 22:1973, insurers are liable for knowingly “(1)
misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions; (2) failing to pay a
settlement within thirty days after an agreement is reduced to writing; (3) denying
coverage or attempting to settle a claim on the basis of an application which the
insurer knows was altered without notice to, or knowledge of consent of, the
insured; and (4) misleading a claimant as to the applicable prescriptive period.”
Id. § 22:1973.
14. Id. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892.
15. See Richard K. O’Donnell, Imputation of Fraud and Bad Faith: The Role
of the Public Adjuster, Co-insured and Independent Adjuster, 22 TORT & INS. L.J.
662 (1987); PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
16. See Loehn v. Hardin, No. 02-257, 2002 WL 922380, at *2 (E.D. La. May
6, 2002); Motin v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 03-2487, 2003 WL 22533673, at *4
(E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2003).
17. See Franklin v. Fountain Grp. Adjusters LLC, 249 So. 3d 84, 86 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2018); Hickman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 262 So. 2d 385, 390 (La. 1972).
18. See Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799,
802 (Ct. App. 1999).
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duty to insureds. Given the intricacies associated with the analysis and the
number of factors affecting the status of adjuster duties––including the
delegation of such duties, agency law, policy, and legislative intent⎯the
Louisiana Legislature should develop a statute providing a general rule
that independent adjusters owe no duty to insureds. Additionally, courts
should impute liability for the actions of independent adjusters to insurers,
with the exception of situations where independent adjusters are
independent contractors and have assumed a duty through the actions
discussed in case law.19
Further, the Louisiana Legislature should amend Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 to specifically clarify that courts should
only hold insurers statutorily liable when the insurance adjuster is an
employee or the actions of the insurer itself are knowing, arbitrary,
capricious, or without probable cause.20 In general, Louisiana courts have
ruled that the statutory duties of insurers are non-delegable.21 Accordingly,
insurance companies cannot escape liability under § 22:1973 and
§ 22:1892 by delegating duties to an independent adjuster.22 While courts
should enforce this general rule to deter insurance companies from
attempting to insulate themselves from liability, the Louisiana Legislature
should amend § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 to clarify that insurance
companies are not liable for the bad faith actions of an independent
adjuster when the adjuster qualifies as an independent contractor and the
insurer did not behave in a way that was knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or
without probable cause.23 The purpose of this amendment is to avoid
discouraging insurance companies from utilizing independent adjusters in
good faith through the imposition of penalties on conduct that is not
knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.24
19. For a discussion of the exceptions to the general rule, see Dillon v.
Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30,
2006); Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06-618, 2006 WL 3313721,
at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1981).
20. See infra Part V.
21. See Hoffman v. Ellender, No. 15-309-JWD-RLB, 2015 WL 4873342
(M.D. La. July 23, 2015); Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 05-6315, 2016 WL
3141247 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006).
22. Eldridge v. Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co., 221 N.W.2d 16 (S.D. 1974).
23. See Richard B. Graves III, Comment, Bad-Faith Denial of Insurance
Claims: Whose Faith, Whose Punishment? An Examination of Punitive Damages
and Vicarious Liability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 395, 396 (1990).
24. Id.
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Part I of this Comment will provide background information on
insurance companies, independent adjusters, the importance of duties in
general, and the duties of insurance companies in Louisiana under Revised
Statutes § 22:1892 and § 22:1973. Additionally, Part I will introduce the
question of whether courts should impute liability from independent
adjusters to insurance companies, as well as the majority and minority
views on independent adjuster liability.25 Part II will examine Louisiana’s
treatment of independent adjuster liability and the duties that courts
typically ascribe to insurers versus adjusters. Part II will also include a
discussion of the legislative intent behind § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 to
determine the scope, extent, and nature of the duties imposed and conduct
discouraged.26 Part III will analyze agency law, its limitations on
independent contractors, and the categorization of independent adjusters
in this scheme, including an examination of the differences between
employee adjusters and independent adjusters.27 Part IV will study the
potential policy implications for Louisiana from the imputation of liability
to insurers from independent adjusters and that imputation’s cohesiveness
in the state’s system of duty-risk.28 Finally, Part V will explore different
legislative and judicial remedies for this ambiguity in Louisiana law,
examine the implications of each solution, and propose that courts should
generally impute liability from independent adjusters to insurers, subject
to some exceptions.
I. DUTIES, AND INSURANCE COMPANIES, AND INDEPENDENT ADJUSTERS,
OH MY!
Insurance companies often hire independent adjusters to evaluate
claims on their behalf.29 Independent adjusters are non-employee
insurance adjusters whom insurance companies contractually hire to
represent the company’s interest.30 While insurance companies are
responsible for the ultimate decision of whether to approve or deny a claim
and the amount of payment,31 independent adjusters are only responsible

25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See Dupree v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 51 So. 3d 673 (La. 2010); La Louisiane
Bakery Co. v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 61 So. 3d 17 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011).
30. LA. REV. STAT. § 22:1704(b) (2012).
31. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr.
2d 799 (Ct. App. 1999).
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for determining coverage liability and the economic value of a claim for
loss.32
All adjusters, whether independent or employee, must become
certified and licensed in compliance with the licensing provisions of the
particular state in which they are adjusting.33 Independent adjusters,
however, differ from employee adjusters in that the latter are in-house
employees of an insurance company, whereas the former generally work
in independent adjusting firms that insurance companies hire on a
contractual basis.34 Regardless of classification as independent or
employee, an adjuster and an adjustment firm may only be individually
liable if they owe a duty to insureds.35
A. Duties in General
There are many types of duties in Louisiana law, but one of the most
common is a duty derived in tort.36 Louisiana Civil Code article 2315(A)
provides, “Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”37 One way that such
damage occurs is through negligence, or a failure to exercise reasonable
care.38 The primary consideration in determining liability in a negligence
action is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty to exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances and whether the alleged tortfeasor breached
that duty.39 Furthermore, the issue of whether an individual owes a duty
that derives from either a statutory or jurisprudential source is “a question
of law.”40 Thus, duties can stem from contractual relationships, statutes,

32. PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
33. See Adam Gardiner, How to Become an Insurance Claims Adjuster in 5
Steps, ADJUSTERPRO (July 31, 2018), https://www.adjusterpro.com/blog/how-tobecome-an-insurance-claims-adjuster-in-5-steps/ [https://perma.cc/WQ3E-2W2E].
34. Id.; Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799.
35. See generally Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991) (discussing
how a municipal officer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring and
training deputies, the breach of which resulted in potential liability in an action
for negligence).
36. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2019).
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 2316.
39. See generally Roberts, 605 So. 2d at 1032 (discussing how a municipal
officer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring and training deputies, the
breach of which resulted in potential liability in an action for negligence).
40. Id. at 1043. Since duty is a question of law, a judge determines it. Id.
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jurisprudence, or circumstance, but they are necessary for liability in tort
claims.41
B. Duties Under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:1892 and
§ 22:1973
While some duties stem from tort, others derive directly from statutes
and require a contractual relationship.42 For example, Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 22:1973 and § 22:1892 recognize a contractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing that insurance companies owe in the evaluation,
settlement, and payment of insurance claims.43 The first of these statutes,
§ 22:1973, provides that:
An insurer . . . owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair
dealing. The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly
and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with
the insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches
these duties shall be liable for any damages sustained as a result
of the breach.44
Further, the statute details several acts constituting a breach of the
insurer’s duties, including the failure to pay an amount due to an insured
under the contract “within sixty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of
loss from the claimant when such failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without
probable cause.”45 Louisiana courts have consistently defined
“satisfactory proof of loss” as notice sufficient to fully inform the insurer
that it has “some liability to the insured.”46 The arbitrary or capricious
standard, however, is more flexible and depends on the context of the
case.47
Louisiana courts have defined “arbitrary, capricious, or without
probable cause” in a variety of ways regarding an insurer’s failure to pay.48
An arbitrary or capricious failure to pay occurs when there is no good faith
defense for the failure to pay a claim, or if the lack of payment is
41. Id.
42. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892 (2019); Smith v. Citadel Ins.
Co., 285 So. 3d 1062, 1069–70 (La. 2019).
43. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892.
44. Id. § 22:1973(A).
45. Id. § 22:1973(B)(5).
46. La. Bag Co. v. Audubon Indem. Co., 999 So. 2d 1104, 1115 (La. 2008).
47. Shelton v. Williams, 277 So. 3d 834, 842 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2019).
48. Id.; Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186, 206 (La. 2008); La. Bag
Co., 999 So. 2d at 1114.
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unreasonable or without probable cause.49 Furthermore, an arbitrary act is
one “based on random choice or personal whim, rather than reason or
system,” while “capricious” means “given to sudden and unaccountable
changes in behavior.”50 Both § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 require behavior to
be knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause in order for
courts to hold an insurer liable.51
Insurers have similar duties under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 22:1892, which states, “All insurers issuing any type of
contract . . . shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within
thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or
any party in interest.”52 The provisions of § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 are
almost identical, except for the description of the duty in § 22:1973 as one
of good faith with a 60-day period to pay and the description of the duty
in § 22:1892 as one to timely pay within 30 days.53
More importantly, the penalties that each statute allows are one of their
greatest differences.54 When insurers violate the good-faith duty and 60day period under § 22:1973, the court may impose penalties of no more
than double the damages or $5,000, whichever is greater.55 Contrastingly,
the penalties for failure to pay within 30 days under § 22:1892 are half the
amount due from the insurer to the insured or $1,000, whichever is greater,
combined with reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.56 Because of the
similarity of the statutes, courts have allowed for recovery under the
statute providing the greater penalty when the requirements for recovery
under both are met.57 Additionally, an individual may recover penalties
and damages under § 22:1973 while also recovering attorney’s fees under
§ 22:1892 because the former does not provide for the recovery of
attorney’s fees.58 While the examination of the sources of duties is

49. Shelton, 277 So. 3d at 841–42.
50. La. Bag Co., 999 So. 2d at 1114 (citing Reed v. State Farm Auto. Ins.
Co., 857 So. 2d 1012, 1020 (La. 2003)).
51. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892 (2019).
52. Id. § 22:1892(A)(1).
53. See Leland v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 77 So. 3d 1078 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2011); Calogero v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 735 So. 2d 170, 174 (La. 2000).
54. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892.
55. Id. § 22:1973(C).
56. Id. § 22:1892(B)(1).
57. XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 440,
444 (E.D. La. 2013).
58. Id.
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important, the parties to which such duties apply also require examination
and understanding.59
C. Independent Adjusters––Generally
Courts and legislatures define independent insurance adjusters
similarly in all states, but such adjusters receive disparate treatment
throughout the country.60 There are two opposing viewpoints in the United
States concerning whether independent adjusters owe a duty to insureds
that may lead to liability if breached.61 The majority view is that such
adjusters do not owe a duty to insureds and thus cannot be liable.62 In
contrast, the minority view holds that independent adjusters owe a duty to
insureds and therefore can be liable.63 While the Louisiana Supreme Court
has not definitively discussed whether independent adjusters owe any duty
to insureds, at least one Louisiana federal court has found that such
adjusters owe no duty to insureds under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 22:1892 and § 22:1973.64 Therefore, in determining whether
independent adjusters could be independently liable to insureds, it is
helpful to examine the national majority and minority views on the issue.65
1. Majority View on Independent Adjuster Duties
The national majority view is that courts should not hold independent
insurance adjusters individually liable for negligence to policyholders
because adjusters lack an independent duty to insureds.66 Thirteen states67
have reached this conclusion based upon the lack of an independent duty
of insurance adjusters.68 Courts that adopt this majority view depend on
59. PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Riley v. Transamerica Ins. Grp. Premier Ins. Co., 923 F. Supp. 882, 888
(E.D. La. 1996).
65. See PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
66. Id.
67. The thirteen states are as follows: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida,
Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Texas, and Vermont. Id.
68. Id.; see also Silon v. Am. Home Assur. Co., No. 25715, 2009 WL
1090700 (D. Nev. Apr. 21, 2009); Icasiano v. Allstate Ins. Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d
1187 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Vargas v. Cal. State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 788 F.
Supp. 462 (D. Nev. 1992); Akpan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., Inc., 961 So. 2d 865
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two principal justifications for rejecting independent negligence claims
against adjusters: (1) lack of contractual privity and (2) public policy
considerations.69 Further, most states only allow for claims against
independent adjusters based on bad faith or breach of insurance policy
because of the controlling nature of the policy itself and the general lack
of a negligence cause of action.70 In support of its finding of no duty, the
majority view cites several policy considerations.71
In Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Services, Inc., the California
Second Circuit Court of Appeal discussed the majority view’s public
policy considerations in detail.72 In Sanchez, the insured filed suit against
its cargo insurer and the insurer’s adjuster for the adjuster’s negligence in
causing a delay in resolving its claim for damage to a commercial dryer
during delivery to a customer.73 Such delay allegedly resulted in the
insured being liable to the buyer for a judgment of $1.32 million.74 The
California Second Circuit outlined several relevant policy considerations
in determining whether adjusters should owe an independent duty to
insureds, including (1) the blameworthiness of adjuster conduct relative to
the decision-making power given to said adjuster in the context of the
relationship with the claimant; (2) whether a duty would create conflicting
obligations for the adjuster; (3) a cost-benefit analysis of imposing an
adjuster duty; (4) whether such a duty would contradict existing case law
concerning insurer liability; (5) whether the creation of an adjuster duty
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Meineke v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 991 P.2d 267 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1999); Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799
(Ct. App. 1999); King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire and Cas. Co., 656 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995); Bass v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 1087 (Miss. 1991); Haney
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 277 S.W.3d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Velastequi v. Exch. Ins.
Co., 505 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Civ. Ct. 1986); Koch v. Bell, Lewis & Assocs., Inc., 627
S.E.2d 636 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Hudock v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 264 A.2d 668
(Pa. 1970); Charleston Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 586
S.E.2d 586 (S.C. 2003); Dagley v. Haag Eng’g Co., 18 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000); Dear v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997); Hamill
v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 892 A.2d 226 (Vt. 2005).
69. PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
70. Id.; see also Meineke, 726 P.2d 267 (citing Miel v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 1333, 1340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no claim for insurer’s
negligent mishandling of an insurance claim)); King. v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas.
Co., 656 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that only actions
for bad faith or breach of contract were valid against insurer).
71. Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802; see also PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
72. Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802; see also PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
73. Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.
74. Id.
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would cause the judiciary to overstep into the legislative arena; and (6)
whether an adjuster duty would fit into the principles of agency law.75 The
court then explained each of these factors in detail.76
The first factor weighed in favor of independent adjusters not owing a
duty to insureds because the contract between the adjuster and the insurer
does not include the insured, and the contract grants the ultimate power to
grant or deny coverage to the insurer.77 Because the adjuster did not have
a contract with the insured, exposing her to a greater duty would create an
unfair balance because she does not have the ability to limit her exposure
to liability, resulting in liability greater than that of the insurer.78 Further,
the second factor weighed against a duty because conflicting loyalties may
arise between the insurer and insureds⎯over things like coverage or
amount of loss⎯that would create an obligation for the adjuster to argue
both sides of such a dispute.79
A cost-benefit analysis of imposing a duty on independent adjusters,
the third policy factor, demonstrated that the deterrent effect of such a duty
would be low because of pre-existing liability to the insurer that hired the
adjuster for breach of contract.80 Therefore, a new duty would only mildly
increase deterrence of improper adjuster conduct.81 Additionally, only a
small benefit would accrue by imposing such a duty because insureds
already have an avenue of recovery against insurers for unreasonable
investigation or claims handling, which is the equivalent of recovery for
statutory bad faith in Louisiana.82 In contrast to the small benefits,
assigning a duty to independent adjusters would produce several
substantial costs, including increased risks or liabilities of independent
adjusters to insureds and a potential increase in insureds’ premiums as a
result of the new need for insurance for independent adjusters.83 Although

75. PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10 (citing Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801–03).
76. Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The full list of costs reads as follows: (1) adjusters would lack a contract
with insureds and thus lack a means of describing their potential risks or liabilities
to insureds; (2) adjusters would turn to in-house options to protect themselves
from liability to insureds for negligence, thus decreasing the supply of
independent adjusters; (3) the remaining independent adjusters would suffer
increased costs because of the need for liability insurance; and (4) insureds’
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the California Second Circuit found that the costs of imposing a duty upon
independent adjusters outweighed the potential benefits, it still went on to
examine several other policy considerations.84
In discussing the fourth policy consideration, the court found that no
California case had held independent adjusters liable to insureds for
negligence, and therefore the assignment of the new duty would depart
from existing state law.85 The court’s analysis of the fifth consideration
weighed against a duty because adjusters rely on the law as it is
now⎯holding that adjusters owe no duty to insureds––and do not take any
steps to protect against liability for negligence.86 Therefore, the court
found that changing this standard would create an entirely new body of
law, which would take a considerable amount of time to fully develop.87
Finally, the court’s policy analysis ended with a discussion of the sixth
factor, agency law.88 The court stated that adjusters are agents and insurers
their principals, and the general laws of agency provide, “Agents are not
liable to third parties for economic loss.”89 Therefore, the court found that
the sixth and final policy consideration also weighed against the
assignment of a duty to independent adjusters, resulting in unanimous
support for the lack of any duty on the part of independent adjusters.90
Although this case reflects one state’s rationale, it is indicative of the
perspective of other majority-view states⎯that courts should not hold
independent insurance adjusters individually liable for negligence to
policyholders.91
2. Minority View
Notwithstanding a majority of states finding that independent
adjusters owe no duty to insureds, some states have adopted an opposing
view.92 A minority of states, including New Hampshire and Alaska, have
premiums may increase if adjusters pass on the cost of such insurance to the
insurance companies employing their services. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 803.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 802; see also PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
92. PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10; Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 506 A.2d
333, 334 (N.H. 1986); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281,
288 (Alaska 1980).
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found that independent adjusters owe a duty to insureds, even without
contractual privity.93 For example, in Morvay v. Hanover, the insureds
filed suit against independent adjusters hired by the insurer for
nonpayment of an insurance claim.94 The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, drawing on the importance of compliance with state
regulations for licensing purposes, found that independent adjusters have
a general duty to perform their work using due care.95 The duty was
identical to that owed in negligence actions—a duty to protect against
reasonably foreseeable harm.96 The court ultimately found that the
independent adjusters could be liable to the insureds in an action for
negligence because the adjusters were fully aware the Morvays could
suffer economic harm if the insurer denied their claim as a result of a
negligent investigation.97 Therefore, the minority view is that independent
adjusters owe a duty to both the insured and the insurer to “conduct a fair
and reasonable investigation of an insurance claim.”98 Thus, although a
contract only existed between the insurer and the independent adjusters in
Morvay, the insured was a foreseeably affected third party.99 By focusing
on the foreseeability of the damage caused and the allowance of recovery
in the absence of privity of contract, the law of minority-view states shares
some similarities with Louisiana law.100 The concept of foreseeability is
an important aspect of liability in Louisiana law, particularly with respect
to recovery for purely economic loss in the absence of privity of
contract.101
3. Louisiana: No Contract, No Problem
Louisiana allows recovery in tort for pure economic loss as a result of
negligent misrepresentation, even in the absence of privity of contract, as
93. PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10. The states adopting the minority view
include New Hampshire and Alaska. See Morvay, 506 A.2d 333 (finding
independent adjusters owe a duty to insureds without requiring contractual
privity); Cont’l Ins. Co., 608 P.2d 281 (finding an independent adjusting firm
owed duty to insured).
94. Morvay, 506 A.2d at 334.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 335.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007, 1014 (La. 1993);
Morvay, 506 A.2d at 335.
101. See Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1014.
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long as a duty exists.102 Therefore, although no contract exists between
independent adjusters and insureds, recovery against an independent
adjuster is possible, unlike majority-view states that require privity of
contract.103 In this respect, Louisiana law is more akin to the minority view
because of the possibility of recovery in the absence of privity of
contract.104 Given the possibility for recovery in the absence of privity of
contract in Louisiana, the next question is whether independent adjusters
owe any duty to insureds, and thereafter whether Louisiana falls within the
majority view, the minority view, or somewhere in between.105
II. DO INDEPENDENT ADJUSTERS OWE A DUTY TO INSUREDS UNDER
LOUISIANA LAW?
Louisiana courts and the state legislature must determine whether
courts should hold independent adjusters individually liable.106 The
question of the liability of independent adjusters depends directly on
whether independent adjusters owe any duty to insureds and, if so, where
such a duty originates.107 Further, there are several types of duties that
independent adjusters may owe to insureds, including a statutory duty of
good faith, a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing, a contractual
duty, and a general duty to exercise reasonable care.108 Each of these duties
originates from a different source, such as a contract, the relationship
between the parties, a statute, or case law.109
102. Id.
103. See generally id. (finding economic recovery allowable even in the
absence of privity of contract). See also PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
104. See generally Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1014 (finding economic recovery
allowable even in the absence of privity of contract). See also PLITT & PLITT,
supra note 10.
105. See generally Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1014 (finding economic recovery
allowable even in the absence of privity of contract). See also PLITT & PLITT,
supra note 10.
106. See Dillon v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at
*3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06618, 2006 WL 3313721, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy,
396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
107. See Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3; Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL
3313721, at *4; Alarcon, 538 So. 2d at 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d at 371.
108. See Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3; Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL
3313721, at *4; Alarcon, 538 So. 2d at 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d at 371.
109. See Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3; Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL
3313721, at *4; Alarcon, 538 So. 2d at 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d at 371.
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A. Insurers’ Duties Under Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:1892,
22:1973
Louisiana’s duty of good faith differs from the common-law duty of
good faith and fair dealing, as the former is recognized in statutes rather
than case law.110 Revised Statutes § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 recognize the
good-faith duties of insurance companies, but the duties actually derive
from the contract itself.111 A reading of the plain language of the statutes
provides that both statutes recognize duties belonging distinctively to
“insurers,” as they are the only party the statutes mention as owing a duty
to insureds.112 It is necessary to examine case law on the matter, however,
because a plain-language reading alone is insufficient to prove that an
insurer’s duties under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:1892 and
§ 22:1973 are non-delegable.113
Few Louisiana courts have spoken specifically on the nature of the
insurer’s statutory duties of good faith, but those courts that have done so
hold that such duties are non-delegable.114 Two cases decided in the
federal district courts of Louisiana demonstrate as much: Hoffman v.
Ellender and Rosinia v. Lexington Insurance Co.115 In Hoffman, State
Farm assigned Cindy Ellender, an employee adjuster, rather than an
independent adjuster, to adjust the plaintiff’s homeowner’s insurance
claim regarding a burned down house.116 During the investigation of the
claim, Ellender asked inappropriate questions that led to an argument and
ultimately to threats from Ellender to retaliate against the homeowner
through her investigation of the claim.117 State Farm denied the claim, and
the plaintiff alleged bad faith for an arbitrary and capricious failure to
pay.118 The Middle District of Louisiana found that the plaintiff had no
110. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892 (2019); see Smith v.
Citadel Ins. Co., 285 So. 3d 1062, 1069–70 (La. 2019).
111. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892; see also Smith v. Citadel Ins.
Co., 285 So. 3d 1062, 1069–70 (La. 2019).
112. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1973, 22:1892. Section 1892 provides that
“all insurers issuing any type of contract” owe a duty, whereas § 1973 provides “an
insurer . . . owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Id.
113. See Hoffman v. Ellender, No. 15-309-JWD-RLB, 2015 WL 4873342
(M.D. La. 2015); Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-6315, 2006 WL 3141247
(E.D. La. 2006).
114. See generally Hoffman, 2015 WL 4873342; Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247.
115. See Hoffman, 2015 WL 4873342; Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247.
116. See Hoffman, 2015 WL 4873342, at *1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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basis of recovery against Ellender because insurance companies cannot
delegate their duties of care to an employee adjuster.119
Similarly, in Rosinia, Lexington Insurance Company hired Central
Claims Service to adjust the plaintiff’s claims, and then Central assigned
the claim to Integrity Adjusters, creating an independent-adjuster
relationship.120 In a very short opinion, the Eastern District of Louisiana
found that the plaintiffs had no claim against the independent adjuster
because there was no statutory support demonstrating that the Louisiana
Legislature intended the duties to be delegable to insurance adjusters.121
The Rosinia court considered the important principle of legislative
intent⎯a staple in Louisiana law.122 The Louisiana Revised Statutes
provide that when the meaning of a statute is unclear, courts should
examine the legislative intent surrounding the enactment of the statute.123
Although the Eastern District and the Middle District mention legislative
intent, they fail to provide a detailed explanation of that intent and the nondelegable nature of the duties.124 Because Louisiana courts do not provide
a detailed explanation of legislative intent surrounding Revised Statutes
§ 22:1892 and § 22:1973 and why the statutory duties of insurers are nondelegable, it is helpful to look at additional areas where Louisiana courts
have found duties to be non-delegable.125
1. Non-Delegable Duties and Where to Find Them
In general, individuals other than those who owe a non-delegable duty
cannot, as a principle of law, perform such a duty.126 The main policy
119. Id. at *6.
120. Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247, at *1.
121. Id.
122. See LA. REV. STAT. § 24:177 (2019).
123. See id.
124. See Hoffman, 2015 WL 4873342; Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247.
125. See Hoffman, 2015 WL 4873342; Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247.
126. See, e.g., Foster v. Destin Trading Corp., 700 So. 2d 199, 209 (La. 1997)
(noting that owner of vessel has a non-delegable duty to furnish a seaworthy
vessel, which duty “extends to a defective condition of the ship, its equipment, or
appurtenances,” even when caused by third parties and not known by the owner);
Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285, 1293 (La. 1978) (holding that building
owner owes non-delegable duty to “keep his building in repair and free of defects
constituting an unreasonable risk of injuries to others” and cannot exculpate
himself from liability by hiring a contractor to perform these duties); McLin v.
Breaux, 950 So. 2d 711 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006) (finding a surgeon has a nondelegable duty to account for all sponges and could not escape liability by
discharging such duty to nurses. Any action performed by nurse was a remedial
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reason behind non-delegable duties is “that the responsibility is so
important to the community that the employer should not be permitted to
transfer it to another.”127 Conceptually, non-delegable duties are essential
to this argument because Louisiana courts have consistently held that
individuals or entities possessing non-delegable duties cannot escape
liability by hiring a third party to perform the assigned duty.128
Louisiana courts have found that the following parties owe nondelegable duties: surgeons, vessel owners, and building owners.129 Such
non-delegable duties derive from different sources, and through an
examination of those sources, a comparison may be drawn to the statutory
duties of insurance companies.130 For example, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Grant v. Touro Infirmary established a jurisprudential rule that
the duty of surgeons is non-delegable.131 In Grant, the Court held that
surgeons have a non-delegable duty to account for all surgical supplies,
reasoning that the accounting of sponges was a procedure adopted by the
hospital and its doctors as a safety measure.132 Therefore, the Court held
that the surgeon is the one responsible for inserting, and later removing,
the sponges.133 Similarly, the non-delegable duty of vessel owners arises
from its longstanding acceptance in the law of admiralty and in its
consistent jurisprudential repetition.134 In the context of the insurer’s
statutory duties of good faith, there is neither precedent from the Louisiana
Supreme Court nor consistent jurisprudential repetition of the principle

measure that could not relieve the surgeon of his duty or liability for breach of
such duty).
127. O’Donnell, supra note 15 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS (W. Page Keeton 5th ed. 1984)).
128. See Foster, 700 So. 2d at 209; Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1293; McLin, 950 So.
2d at 711.
129. See Foster, 700 So. 2d at 209; Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1293; McLin, 950 So.
2d at 711.
130. See Hoffman, 2015 WL 4873342; Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247; Foster,
700 So. 2d at 209; Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1293; McLin, 950 So. 2d at 711.
131. McLin, 950 So. 2d at 715.
132. Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 223 So. 2d 148, 155 (La. 1969), overruled on
other grounds, Garlington v. Kingsley, 289 So. 2d 88 (La. 1974).
133. Id.
134. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 95 n.11 (1946); Foster,
700 So. 2d at 209; Fl. Fuels, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 6 F.3d 330, 332 (La.
Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1993); Brister v. A.W.I. Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 355 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 1991).
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that the insurer’s statutory duties of good faith are non-delegable.135 Not
all non-delegable duties derive from case law, however.136
In contrast to the duties of surgeons and vessel owners, the nondelegable duty of building owners to keep their buildings and their
appurtenances in repair derives from Louisiana Civil Code article
2322.137 Article 2322 provides that the owner of a building is responsible
for the damage caused by it but is only liable for damages when she knew
or should have known of the damage-causing defect and fails to exercise
reasonable care in preventing the damage.138 The Louisiana Supreme
Court case Olsen v. Shell Oil Co. demonstrates this codal duty.139
In Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the
statutory duty of building owners by discussing two competing theories of
non-delegable duties: the fault theory and the risk theory.140 The fault
theory states that liability is based on the owner’s fault in failing to attend
to the building.141 By contrast, the risk theory focuses on the concept that
although an owner may have a right to indemnification against another
party, the owner is primarily responsible for damage caused by the
building as an exchange for the advantages of owning the building.142
2. Insurers’ Duties: Non-Delegable By Analogy
The risk theory applies directly to the relationship between insurance
companies and adjusters because insurance companies hold all of the
power in their relationships with insureds.143 Therefore, insurers can easily

135. See Hoffman, 2015 WL 4873342; Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247.
136. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2322 (2019); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So.
2d 1285, 1291 (La. 1978).
137. See Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1291; see also id. art. 2322.
138. Id. art. 2322 (“The owner of a building is answerable for the damage
occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the
result of a vice or defect in its original construction. However, he is answerable
for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known of the vice or defect which caused the damage, that the
damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he
failed to exercise such reasonable care.”).
139. See Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1291 n.13.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. Insurers hold all of the power in their relationships with insureds
because of the necessity of insurance. See Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d
695, 697 (Tex. 1994).
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take advantage of insureds through contracts.144 While insurance
companies have a right to indemnification against independent adjusters
through contract, insurance companies must still bear the burden of the
damage in exchange for the powers they possess.145 Therefore, Louisiana
courts’ analyses of non-delegable duties suggest that Louisiana courts
should consider the duties of insurers under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 22:1892 and § 22:1973 non-delegable.146
Although the non-delegable nature of the statutory duties limits the
situations in which an insurance company is not liable for the acts of its
independent adjusters, it does not completely eliminate the possibility of
such a situation.147 Furthermore, insurers’ non-delegable statutory duties
do not prevent independent adjusters from having a concurrent duty.148 For
example, the duty of surgeons to patients is particularly noteworthy⎯as
Louisiana courts have found nurses concurrently liable despite the nondelegable nature of the surgeon’s duty.149 In Johnston v. Southwest
Louisiana Ass’n, the court found that although the duty of a surgeon to
account for surgical sponges is non-delegable, nurses have an independent
duty to perform the same task for which “they can be concurrently at fault
with the surgeon.”150 Applying this logic to the case of independent
adjusters and insurers means that if the duty of insurers under Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 is non-delegable, then
independent adjusters may still have a concurrent duty⎯from a nonstatutory source⎯allowing courts to hold such adjusters individually
liable.151 Therefore, although insurance companies may not be able to

144. Natividad, 875 S.W.2d at 697.
145. See generally Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1291 n.13; Natividad, 875 S.W. 2d at
697 (analyzing non-delegable duties in reference to the risk theory and the fault
theory).
146. See Hoffman v. Ellender, No. 15-309-JWD-RLB, 2015 WL 4873342
(M.D. La. July 23, 2015); Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 05-6315, 2006 WL
3141247 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006); Foster v. Destin Trading Corp., 700 So. 2d
199, 209 (La. 1997); Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1293 (La. 1978); McLin v. Breaux, 950
So. 2d 711 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006).
147. See generally Johnston v. Sw. La. Ass’n, 693 So. 2d 1195 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1997) (finding nurses can have a concurrent duty to that of surgeons).
148. See generally id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1198; see also McLin, 950 So. 2d at 717; Grant v. Touro Infirmary,
223 So. 2d 148, 155 (La. 1969), overruled on other grounds, Garlington v.
Kingsley, 289 So. 2d 88 (La. 1974).
151. See generally Johnston, 693 So. 2d 1195.
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delegate their statutory duties to independent adjusters, such adjusters may
owe a duty of their own.152
B. Do Insurance Adjusters Generally Owe a Duty to Insureds?
There is a dichotomy of views in the Eastern District of Louisiana
regarding the circumstances in which adjusters owe a duty to insureds.153
The cases of Loehn v. Hardin and Motin v. Travelers Insurance Co.
demonstrate this disagreement.154 In Loehn, the plaintiffs filed suit against
State Farm and its employee adjuster.155 State Farm argued that there was
diversity jurisdiction because Kelly Hardin, the employee adjuster who
destroyed diversity, was not a proper party to the suit.156 This argument
was based on the plaintiff lacking a cause of action against the adjuster.157
The Eastern District of Louisiana used a four-part test from Dufrene v.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. to determine whether an employee owes
an independent duty to a customer: (1) the employer must owe a duty to
the claimant; (2) the employer must delegate that duty to a particular
employee; (3) the employee must breach this duty; and (4) individual
liability may only be imposed when the employee has an individual duty
to the plaintiff, not when the employee only has a general responsibility
for the performance of a function of their employment.158 The court
ultimately held that State Farm delegated its duty to the adjuster and that
the adjuster was a proper party because her alleged conduct was sufficient
to breach State Farm’s duty.159 The court found that the plaintiff’s
allegations of a breach of the duty of proper claim handling because of an
insufficient investigation and misrepresentation of policy coverages were
sufficient to support a cause of action against the adjuster.160 Despite this
finding, the Eastern District later contradicted its own view in Motin.161
152. See, e.g., Loehn v. Hardin, No. 02-257, 2002 WL 922380, at *2 (E.D. La.
May 6, 2002).
153. Compare id., with Motin v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 03-2487, 2003 WL
22533673, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2003).
154. Compare Loehn, 2002 WL 922380, at *2, with Motin, 2003 WL
22533673, at *4.
155. Loehn, 2002 WL 922380, at *2.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.; see also Dufrene v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 92-3470, 1993
WL 35128 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 1993).
159. Loehn, 2002 WL 922380, at *2.
160. Id.
161. Motin, 2003 WL 22533673, at *4.
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Nearly six months later, the Eastern District of Louisiana expressly
disagreed with the Loehn court’s holding that adjusters owe a duty to
insureds.162 In Motin, Bonnie Motin sued her homeowner’s insurer,
Travelers Insurance Company, and its employee adjuster, Folse, for
intentional breach of contract and bad faith claims in violation of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes.163 Motin alleged that Folse failed to provide
her with a copy of her insurance policy after Folse notified her that she
might not be covered and that the insurer failed to accept or deny coverage
within 60 days from proof of loss.164 The court found that the duty to
properly handle insurance claims derived from the Louisiana Revised
Statutes, which impose a duty only upon insurers and lack legislative
intent for allowing delegation of such a duty to adjusters.165 This reasoning
focused on the principle that courts should strictly construe penal
statutes166⎯or those imposing penalties.167 The Eastern District in Motin
did, however, note that some circumstances may exist in which insurance
adjusters owe a duty to insureds, but those circumstances were not present
in Motin or in Loehn.168 Despite the confusion on this issue, Louisiana
federal and state case law suggests that there is a general rule concerning
the duty of insurance adjusters, subject to a few exceptions.169
1. “We Don’t Need No [Delegation]”: Another Brick in the Wall170
In determining when Louisiana courts should hold independent
adjusters individually liable based on an independent duty, it is first
162. Id.
163. Id. at *3.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *4.
166. Both Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:1973 and § 22:1892 are penal
statutes because they provide for penalties against insureds. See LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 22:1973, 22:1892 (2019).
167. Motin, 2003 WL 22533673, at *4 (citing Yates v. Sw. Life Ins. Co., No.
97-3204, 1998 WL 61033, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 1998)); see also In re Hannover
Corp., 67 F.3d 70 (5th Cir. 1995); Nero v. La. Indep. Ins. Agencies, Inc., No. 033317, 2003 WL 203145, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2003).
168. Motin, 2003 WL 22533673, at *4.
169. See, e.g., Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06-618, 2006
WL 3313721, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Loehn v. Hardin, No. 02-257, 2002
WL 922380 (E.D. La. May 6, 2002); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So.
2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
170. To hear the famous lyrics, “We don’t need no education,” see PINK
FLOYD, ANOTHER BRICK IN THE WALL (PART II) (Columbia Records 1979).
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necessary to examine the general rule against such a duty.171 The general
rule that insurance adjusters do not owe a duty of good faith and fair
dealing or a duty to exercise reasonable care toward insureds is
demonstrated through several Louisiana cases, including Westmoreland v.
Wright National Flood and St. Marie v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Co.172 The general no-duty rule set forth by Louisiana courts is, however,
subject to some exceptions.173 Louisiana federal and state courts have
referenced such exceptions in a variety of cases, such as Pelican
Hospitality Group v. United National Insurance Co., Alarcon v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, Dillon v. Lincoln
General Insurance Co., and Loehn v. Hardin.174
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has not spoken on the issue;
however, the general consensus among Louisiana federal courts and some
Louisiana circuit courts is that insurance adjusters do not owe a duty of
good faith and fair dealing or a duty to exercise reasonable care toward
insureds.175 In a case from the Middle District of Louisiana, Westmoreland
v. Wright National Flood, the plaintiff sued both her insurer and the
independent adjusting company hired by the insurer, asserting a tort claim
against both parties and a breach of contract claim against the insurer.176
The plaintiff alleged that the independent adjusting firm mishandled her
property damage claim following Hurricane Isaac through negligent
misrepresentation and the underestimation of her claims, thereby
breaching the adjuster’s duty of good faith and fair dealing.177 In response
to these claims, the Middle District noted that Louisiana federal courts
applying state law “have consistently held that an insurance adjuster does
not owe a legal duty to an insured to properly investigate or handle claims,
advise an insured on coverage issues or engage good faith dealing.”178
171. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Wright Nat. Flood, No. 13-564, 2014 WL
1343387, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 3, 2014); St. Marie v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
No. 06-8725, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007).
172. Westmoreland, 2014 WL 1343387, at *1; St. Marie, 2007 WL 1017588,
at *3.
173. See, e.g., Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL 3313721, at *4; Alarcon, 538 So.
2d 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371; Loehn, 2002 WL 922380.
174. See, e.g., Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL 3313721, at *4; Alarcon, 538 So.
2d 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371; Loehn, 2002 WL 922380.
175. See Westmoreland, 2014 WL 1343387, at *1; St. Marie, 2007 WL
1017588, at *3; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
176. Westmoreland, 2014 WL 1343387, at *1.
177. Id. at *2.
178. Id. (citing St. Marie, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3) (“With regard to insurance
adjusters, Louisiana courts have consistently held that, as a general rule, an
insurance adjuster owes no duty to an insured to properly investigate or handle
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Additionally, in Westmoreland, the court distinguished the case from
the exception in Dillon v. Lincoln General Insurance Co.,179 stating that
the facts of Dillon differed from Westmoreland because the duty alleged
in Dillon was based on self-dealing.180 Further, the Middle District noted
that the Eastern District’s holding in Loehn v. Hardin, finding that an
insurance company had delegated its duty to an adjuster, was baseless
because of the lack of case law supporting this stance.181 Finally, the
Middle District provided that it was “unable to find any case law that
supports [the Loehn court’s] conclusion.”182 This view, however, ignores
the Loehn court’s use of the four-part Dufrene test for the determination
of whether an employee owes an independent duty to a customer in
conjunction with the Pellerin and Alarcon exceptions.183 Despite this
oversight, the Middle District may not be entirely incorrect in its
conclusion, because other Louisiana courts have agreed.184
For example, in St. Marie v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., the
plaintiffs filed suit against State Farm and its employee adjusters.185 The
plaintiffs alleged that the adjusters arbitrarily and capriciously denied their
claims for hurricane damage and failed to adjust the claims in good faith.186
In finding that the adjusters owed no duty to the plaintiffs, the Eastern
District outlined the different situations contemplated by the general rule
claims, or advise an insured on coverage issues.”); RDS, Inc. v. Gab Robins N.
Am., Inc., No. 2:03 CV 1786, 2005 WL 2045956, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 23, 2005)
(“It is well settled in Louisiana law that a claims adjuster has no duty to an
insured.”); Rich v. Bud’s Boat Rentals, Inc., No. 96-3279, 1997 WL 785668, at
*3 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 1997). (“This Court has found no case imposing a duty on
an independent insurance adjuster to an insured to conduct a proper
investigation . . . .”); Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. United Gen. Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp.
1022, 1024 (W.D. La. 1987) (“Louisiana courts have consistently held that an
adjuster owes no implied duty of good faith to an insured when not a party to the
contract of insurance.”).
179. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 on the Dillon exception.
180. Westmoreland, 2014 WL 1343387, at *3 n.1.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Loehn v. Hardin, No. 02-257, 2002 WL 922380, at *2 (E.D. La. May
6, 2002); see also Dufrene v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 92-3470, 1993 WL
35128 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 1993); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cashway Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
184. See, e.g., St. Marie v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06-8725, 2007 WL
1017588, at *1, *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007).
185. Id. at *1.
186. Id.
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that insurance adjusters do not owe a duty to an insured for the proper
investigation and handling of claims.187 First, the concept that there is
generally no duty of an insurance adjuster to advise a claimant of the
proper prescriptive period derives from Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, which
also provides for an exception to the general rule.188 Further, the Eastern
District of Louisiana’s decision in Rosinia v. Lexington Insurance Co.
stands for the principle that an insurance adjuster does not owe a general
tort duty to an insured.189 Finally, in Rich v. Bud’s Boat Rentals, Inc., the
Eastern District held that the facts of the case did not indicate that the
independent adjuster owed the insured any duty to protect against
negligent and careless claims investigation.190 Therefore, much of the
support for the general rule that insurance adjusters do not owe a duty to
insureds derives from decisions by the Eastern District of Louisiana, the
Middle District of Louisiana, and the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal.191
2. Exceptions to the General Rule––Situations in Which Adjusters
Assume a Duty
Although adjusters, both employee and independent, owe no general
duty to insureds according to Louisiana courts, most courts acknowledge
that adjusters may assume a duty to insureds under certain
circumstances.192 In Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, a case from the Louisiana
First Circuit Court of Appeal, Gladys Pellerin filed suit against Tidelands,
the insurer of Cash Pharmacy, and its adjuster, Glenn Tanner.193 Pellerin
alleged that the adjuster failed to inform her of her claim’s prescriptive
period, causing the claim to prescribe.194 After finding that the adjuster
owed no duty to advise Pellerin of the prescriptive period, the court listed
several examples of circumstances in which an adjuster may assume a duty
to the insured, including “[1] the relative education of the parties, [2] the
diligence of the claimant in seeking the facts, [3] the actual or apparent
187. Id. at *3.
188. Id.; see also Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
189. St. Marie, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3; see also Rosinia v. Lexington Ins.
Co., No. 06-6315, 2006 WL 3141247, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006).
190. St. Marie, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3; see also Rich v. Bud’s Boat Rentals,
Inc., No. 96-3279, 1997 WL 785668 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 1997).
191. See, e.g., St. Marie, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3; Rosinia, 2006 WL
3141247, at *1; Rich, 1997 WL 785668; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
192. See Pellerin, 396 So. 2d at 373; see also St. Marie, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3.
193. Pellerin, 396 So. 2d at 372.
194. Id. at 373.
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authority of the adjuster, [4] the content of his promises to the claimants,
[5] misrepresentation or [6] fraud.”195 The court’s use of language such as
“may” and “examples” shows that it is unlikely that the court intended for
these circumstances to be an exclusive list.196 Therefore, other
circumstances may give rise to adjusters owing a duty to insureds.197
Additionally, as the adjuster in Pellerin worked for an independent
adjusting firm hired by the insurance company, this principle applies to
independent adjusters.198 Since the Pellerin decision, numerous Louisiana
courts have relied upon and expanded the exception set forth by the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal.199
Five years after Pellerin, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
reinforced the First Circuit’s holding that an insurance adjuster may owe
a duty to an insured in certain situations.200 In Alarcon v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co., the plaintiffs filed suit against the insurance company
Aetna and its employee adjuster on the basis that the adjuster grossly
undervalued their claim for property damage, causing mental anguish to
and serious medical problems for the plaintiffs and thus entitling them to
tort damages.201 The Louisiana Fifth Circuit held that the petition failed to
allege the specific circumstances under which the adjuster assumed a duty
to the insureds and that as a result, the insureds did not state a valid cause
of action against the adjuster.202 Although the insureds in this case did not
provide a sufficient basis for the assumption of a duty by the adjuster, the
court acknowledged that such a basis might exist in circumstances like
those set forth in Pellerin and allowed the insured to amend their petition
to this end.203
In more recent cases, the federal district courts of Louisiana have
applied the exceptions discussed by Pellerin and Alarcon, finding that the

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06-618, 2006
WL 3313721, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Dillon v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co.,
No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); Alarcon v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin, 396
So. 2d 371.
200. Alarcon, 538 So. 2d at 699.
201. Id. at 697.
202. Id. at 699.
203. Id. at 697; see also, St. Marie v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06-8725,
2007 WL 1017588, at *1, *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007); Pellerin, 396 So. 2d at 373.
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insurance adjuster owed a duty.204 For example, in Dillon v. Lincoln
General Insurance Co., the Dillons filed suit in the Eastern District of
Louisiana against General Insurance Company and its employee adjuster,
Randy Ramsey, alleging Ramsey misrepresented the value of the vehicles
in an attempt to later acquire the vehicles at a discounted rate.205 The
Eastern District of Louisiana held that insurance adjusters may assume an
independent tort duty to investigate and adjust an insured’s claim.206 The
court noted that unlike in Motin, the plaintiff here alleged sufficient facts
demonstrating that the adjuster assumed a duty to the insured.207 Relying
on Pellerin and Loehn, the Eastern District found that the plaintiff made a
sufficient showing by alleging that the adjuster committed fraud and
misrepresented the policy.208 Intending to eventually acquire the vehicles
at a discounted rate, the adjuster first lied that the vehicles were totaled
and later gave conflicting estimates of the value of the vehicles.209 The
adjuster’s blatant self-dealing was the central element of the court’s
reasoning.210 The plaintiff’s pleading the independent actions of the
adjuster was sufficient to establish the exception set forth in Pellerin,
namely, “the actual or apparent authority of the adjuster, the content of his
promises to the claimants, misrepresentation or fraud.”211
The Eastern District applied Dillon’s logic to a case involving
independent adjusters, Pelican Hospitality Group v. United National
Insurance Co.212 In Pelican, the plaintiff’s restaurant suffered damage
from hurricanes Katrina and Rita.213 The insurance company hired an
independent adjuster to act on its behalf in inspecting and adjusting the
claim.214 Thereafter, the independent adjuster inspected the restaurant but
never reported his findings to the insurance company; consequently, the
insurer never paid claim.215 The plaintiffs then filed suit against the
insurance company and the independent adjuster, seeking penalties and
204. See, e.g., Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3; Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL
3313721, at *1.
205. Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3.
206. Id.; see also St. Marie, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3.
207. Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3 n.2.
208. Id. at *1.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id. at *3; see also, St. Marie, 2007 WL 1017588, at *1, *3.
212. See, e.g., Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06-618, 2006
WL 3313721, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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attorney’s fees for breach of contract and failure to properly handle the
claim.216 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the adjuster
misrepresented coverages and terms of coverage, failed to properly
investigate the claims, or acted negligently through his failure to
adequately or timely investigate the claims.217 Relying on the Pellerin,
Alarcon, and Loehn decisions, the Eastern District again held that the
plaintiffs sufficiently pled “the actual or apparent authority of the adjuster
and his misrepresentations,” indicating the adjuster may have assumed an
independent tort duty to the insured.218 Additionally, as with each of the
cases discussed in this section, the court in Pelican failed to discuss the
principles of agency law and whether the court should impute the
adjuster’s liability to the insurer.219
Although insurance adjusters do not owe an independent duty in a
majority of cases, the above cases demonstrate that insurance adjusters can
owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to insureds under certain
circumstances, such as those described in Pellerin.220 If such adjusters owe
an independent duty, then courts may hold them independently liable to
insureds.221 Despite this possibility of independent adjusters owing a duty
to insureds, the analysis does not end here, as there are other areas in which
such a duty to insureds may exist.222
216. Id.
217. Id. at *2.
218. Id. at *4; see also Loehn v. Hardin, No. 02-257, 2002 WL 922380, at *1
(E.D. La. May 6, 2002); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La.
Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 1981).
219. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Wright Nat. Flood, No. 13-564, 2014 WL
1343387, at *2 (M.D. La. Apr. 3, 2014); St. Marie v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
No. 06-8725, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007); Pelican Hosp.
Grp., 2006 WL 3313721, at *2; Dillon v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006
WL 3469554, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No.
06-6315, 2006 WL 3141247, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006); RDS, Inc. v. Gab
Robins N. Am., Inc., No. 2:03 CV 1786, 2005 WL 2045956, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug.
23, 2005); Rich v. Bud’s Boat Rentals, Inc., No. 96-3279, 1997 WL 785668, at *3
(E.D. La. Dec. 18, 1997); Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. United Gen. Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp.
1022, 1024 (W.D. La. 1987); Alarcon, 538 So. 2d 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
220. See Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL 3313721, at *4; Dillon, 2006 WL
3469554, at *3; Alarcon, 538 So. 2d 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
221. See Pelican Hosp. Grp, 2006 WL 3313721, at *4; Dillon, 2006 WL
3469554, at *3; Alarcon, 538 So. 2d 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
222. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759 (2019); PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10; Nero
v. La. Indep. Ins. Agencies, Inc., No. 03-3317, 2003 WL 203145, at *2 (E.D. La.
Jan. 29, 2003) (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3016).
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C. Contractual Duties and Relationships
Under Louisiana Civil Code article 1759, every contractual
relationship comes with a duty of each party to act in good faith in all acts
pertaining to the obligations created by the contract.223 It is, however,
unlikely that the duty of good faith applies to the adjuster-insured
relationship.224 The contract between an independent adjuster and an
insurance company creates an obligation to adjust the claim and determine
whether such claim is paid.225 Therefore, as provided by code article, the
independent adjuster would have a good-faith duty to adjust the claim and
determine whether it should be paid.226 The article appears, on its face, to
imply that the adjuster owes this duty to the insurance company, as the
insurer is the other party to the contract with the independent adjuster.227
Because the contract calls for the adjustment of an insured’s claim,
however, the contract may stipulate a benefit for a third party––the
insured––through the evaluation of the insured’s claim.228
Louisiana courts require three criteria to be met for a third-party
beneficiary to exist: (1) the stipulation for the third party is clear; (2) the
benefit to be provided is certain; and (3) the benefit is not incidental to the
agreement between the primary parties of the contract.229 Because the
stipulation must be clear, the contract between the insurer and the
independent adjuster must describe the benefit to the insured in the
contract; otherwise, the independent adjuster owes no good faith duty
under article 1759.230 Even if the contract expressly stipulates a benefit for
the insured, it is likely that there would still be no independent duty or
liability for the independent adjuster because of the Louisiana Civil Code
articles231 regarding principals and mandataries.232
Nero v. LA Independent Insurance Agencies, Inc., a case from the
Eastern District of Louisiana, demonstrates the impact of the code articles

223. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759.
224. See id.; see also PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10; Nero, 2003 WL 203145,
at *2 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3016).
225. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759; PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
226. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759; PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
227. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759; PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
228. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1978; PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10.
229. Maggio v. Parker, 250 So. 3d 874, 880 (La. 2018).
230. See generally Nero v. La. Indep. Ins. Agencies, Inc., No. 03-3317, 2003
WL 203145, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2003) (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3016).
231. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2989–3023.
232. See generally Nero, 2003 WL 203145, at *2 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3016).
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regulating principals and mandataries233 on the potential contractual duties
of independent adjusters.234 In Nero, the plaintiffs alleged that Independent
Insurance Agencies, Inc., a mandatary of the main defendant Unitrin,
breached its duty by advising plaintiffs to purchase insurance from Unitrin,
an allegedly suspicious company.235 Citing Louisiana Civil Code article
3016, the Eastern District held that courts may hold agents of a principal
individually liable for breach of contract only if such agents exceed their
authority or personally bind themselves.236 Additionally, Louisiana Civil
Code article 3016 provides that a mandatary operating within the limits of
his authority, as provided by the principal, does not individually obligate
himself for the performance of the contract.237 A mandatary who exceeds
his authority or personally binds himself to a third person can be held
individually liable, however.238 Thus, it is unlikely that independent
adjusters owe any contractual good-faith duty to the insured based on
article 1759 because such adjusters are not parties to the contract with
insureds and can only be held individually liable as mandataries through
exceeding authority or personally binding themselves––both of which fall
outside of the scope of the contract between insurer and insured.239
Despite independent adjusters owing no contractual good-faith duty to
insureds, courts may still hold independent adjusters independently liable,
as duties come from a wide variety of sources besides contracts.240 Statutes
are one of those sources, but courts have held that independent adjusters
do not owe any duty to insureds under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 22:1982 and § 22:1973, because such duties are non-delegable duties of
insurers.241 Moreover, the only duties independent adjusters owe to
insureds are those set out in the cases discussing exceptions to the general
no-duty rule, and thus the circumstances giving rise to such exceptions are
the only situations in which independent adjusters may incur individual
liability.242
233. For reference, the mandatary is an individual upon whom the principal
confers authority to perform certain tasks on behalf of the principal. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2989.
234. Nero, 2003 WL 203145, at *2 (citing LA CIV. CODE art. 3016).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3016.
238. See id. art. 3019.
239. See generally Nero, 2003 WL 203145, at *2 (citing id. art. 3016).
240. See discussion supra Part II.
241. See discussion supra Part II.A.
242. See Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06-618, 2006 WL
3313721, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Dillon v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-
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III. AGENCY LAW: SHOULD COURTS IMPUTE LIABILITY?
Although independent adjusters may assume an independent duty and
thus have the potential for liability to insureds, courts must also consider
the principles of agency law in determining whether to impute such
liability from independent adjusters to insurers.243 Agency law treats
independent contractors differently than employees of a business.244
Therefore, it is first important to determine whether independent adjusters
are classified as employees or independent contractors.245
A. Independent Adjusters vs. Employee Adjusters
A comparison of independent adjusters and employee adjusters
demonstrates that independent adjusters are, on the surface, more like
independent contractors than employees.246 There are several basic
differences between independent adjusters and employee adjusters.247 To
begin, independent adjusters generally work for independent firms that
insurance companies hire on a contractual basis as necessary.248 This often
results in independent adjusters traveling around the country to meet the
demand that damaging events like natural disasters cause.249 Additionally,
insurers often treat independent adjusters as contractors because they can
work for different insurance companies on a contractual basis.250
In contrast, employee adjusters are salaried employees of an insurance
company, usually only operating in a specific region because of their ties

7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash
Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
243. See generally Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285, 1294 n.16 (La.
1978) (finding that employers are not liable for the torts of independent
contractors).
244. See generally id.
245. See generally id.
246. See What is the Difference Between an Independent Adjuster and a Staff
Adjuster?, ADJUSTERPRO, https://www.adjusterpro.com/faq/what-is-the-difference
-between-an-independent-adjuster-and-a-staff-adjuster/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/G7MT-8QLE].
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. TheBestIRS Blog, Independent Insurance Adjuster vs. Claims Adjuster:
What’s the Difference?, THEBESTIRS, https://thebestirs.blog/independent-vsclaims-adjuster/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9JQ2-SDN5].

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 305

12/2/20 7:03 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

302

[Vol. 81

to the company.251 Employee-adjuster jobs offer more stable schedules and
benefits, whereas independent adjusters are contractors and thus enjoy less
predictable schedules and no benefits.252 The distinction between the types
of adjusters is particularly important when determining liability because
employers may be vicariously liable for the actions of their employees that
fall within the course and scope of their employment,253 but companies are
not vicariously liable for the actions of independent contractors.254
Therefore, the question of whether courts should impute liability from
independent adjusters to the insurance companies that hired them depends
upon the classification of independent adjusters.255
B. Agency Law and Independent Contractors
Louisiana courts have failed to explicitly determine whether
independent adjusters are employee agents of insurance companies or
independent contractors, despite the necessity of such a determination.256
The lack of discussion of agency law principles in cases such as Pellerin,
Dillon, Alarcon, and many others demonstrates that Louisiana courts
generally do not treat independent adjusters differently than employee
adjusters when considering whether adjusters owe a duty to insureds.257
The lack of agency discussion in Louisiana jurisprudence is concerning
251. What is the Difference Between an Independent Adjuster and a Staff
Adjuster?, supra note 246.
252. TheBestIRS Blog, supra note 250.
253. Orgeron ex rel. Orgeron v. McDonald, 639 So. 2d 224, 226 (La. 1994).
254. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285, 1294 n.16 (La. 1978).
255. See generally id. (finding employers are not liable for the torts of
independent contractors).
256. See generally id.; see, e.g., Westmoreland v. Wright Nat. Flood, No. 13564, 2014 WL 1343387, at *2 (M.D. La. Apr. 3, 2014); St. Marie v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06-8725, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007);
Dillon v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3 (E.D. La.
Nov. 30, 2006); Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-6315, 2006 WL 3141247,
at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006); RDS, Inc. v. Gab Robins N. Am., Inc., No. 2:03
CV 1786, 2005 WL 2045956, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 23, 2005); Rich v. Bud’s Boat
Rentals, Inc., No. 96-3279, 1997 WL 785668, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 1997); Pac.
Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. United Gen. Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (W.D. La.
1987); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
257. See, e.g., Westmoreland, 2014 WL 1343387, at *2; St. Marie, 2007 WL
1017588, at *3; Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247, at *1; RDS, Inc, 2005 WL 2045956, at
*3; Rich, 1997 WL 785668, at *3; Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. at 1024;
Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371; Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3; Alarcon, 538 So. 2d 696.
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because the general principles of agency law treat independent contractors
much differently than employees.258 Demonstrating this difference, the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding in Olsen v. Shell Oil Co. provides the
general rule that employers are not vicariously liable for the torts of
independent contractors hired by them.259 Nonetheless, an employer may
be liable for damage caused by an independent contractor in the
performance of a non-delegable duty owed by the employer.260 Therefore,
a court’s determination of whether an independent adjuster is an
independent contractor or an employee has a direct effect on whether
courts should impute liability from the adjuster to the insurer.261
The principal consideration in determining whether an individual is an
independent contractor or an employee is the level of control the employer
reserves over the individual’s work.262 This determination does not depend
on the employer actually exercising such supervision and control but
rather upon whether the right to do so exists based on the nature of the
relationship.263 Additionally, courts consider other important factors, such
as (1) the freedom of action and choice in the performance of the task; (2)
the independent nature of the contractor’s business; (3) whether the
employer has control over only the final result or the methods used to
accomplish it; and (4) whether the duration of the work is set for a specific
time or is instead terminable at will.264 For example, an employment-atwill relationship in which the parties may terminate the employment
relationship at any time without cause is one of the most telling signs of
an employer-employee relationship.265 Applying these considerations to
the context of independent adjusters will assist in determining the proper
treatment of independent adjusters according to the principles of agency
law.266

258. Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1294 n.16.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See generally id. (finding that employers are not liable for the torts of
independent contractors).
262. Hickman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 262 So. 2d 385, 390 (La. 1972).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See generally id. (setting forth the independent-contractor test); Olsen,
365 So. 2d at 1294 n.16 (finding employers are not liable for the torts of
independent contractors).
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C. Independent Here, Independent There, Independent
Everywhere?
Louisiana courts have made some cursory comments on whether
independent adjusters are independent contractors, but courts have failed
to engage in any concrete analysis or discussion of the issue.267 For
example, in Franklin v. Fountain Group Adjusters, LLC, the Louisiana
Third Circuit Court of Appeal identified an independent adjuster as an
independent contractor to the adjusting company that hired him.268 In
Franklin, the adjusting company hired an independent adjuster to provide
adjusting services after Hurricane Sandy, and the contract described him
as an independent contractor.269 The parties made no issue of the
independent-contractor status of the adjuster, however, making it a
straightforward case with no need for an application of the independentcontractor test.270 Despite its clarity, Franklin does not set forth a general
rule classifying independent adjusters as independent contractors, as the
court’s classification is a mere cursory mention and not a full agency-law
analysis.271 Ultimately, the terms of each individual contract determine
whether a particular independent adjuster qualifies as an employee or an
independent contractor because of the importance of the contractual
balance of power in categorizing employees and independent
contractors.272
Louisiana courts consistently fail to discuss the characterization of
independent adjusters when determining the liability of such adjusters to
insureds.273 The characterization of independent adjusters, however,
267. See, e.g., Franklin v. Fountain Grp. Adjusters LLC, 249 So. 3d 84, 86 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See id.
272. See generally Hickman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 262 So. 2d 385, 390 (La.
1972) (setting forth the independent-contractor test).
273. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Wright Nat. Flood, No. 13-564, 2014 WL
1343387, at *2 (M.D. La. Apr. 3, 2014); St. Marie v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
No. 06-8725, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007); Dillon v. Lincoln
Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006);
Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-6315, 2006 WL 3141247, at *1 (E.D. La.
Oct. 31, 2006); RDS, Inc. v. Gab Robins N. Am., Inc., No. 2:03 CV 1786, 2005
WL 2045956, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 23, 2005); Rich v. Bud’s Boat Rentals, Inc.,
No. 96-3279, 1997 WL 785668, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 1997); Pac. Emp’rs Ins.
Co. v. United Gen. Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (W.D. La. 1987); Alarcon v.
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directly impacts the question of whether courts should impute liability
from independent adjusters to insurers.274 Thus, Louisiana courts should
apply the independent-contractor test to the facts of each independentadjuster case to determine whether they should impute liability to the
insurer, as the classification of independent adjusters is fact-specific.275
Louisiana courts should classify independent adjusters as employees
when: (1) the contract between the independent adjuster and the insurance
company creates an employment-at-will relationship; (2) the insurer has
the right to control the work of the adjuster; (3) the insurer controls the
methods used to achieve the result; and (4) the adjuster lacks freedom of
action during work.276 When employers exhibit more control over the
work of individuals, the individuals have less freedom in their work and
thus are more like employees.277 Because employers hold all of the
bargaining power, they should also bear all of the responsibility for the
actions of employees.278
Conversely, courts should classify independent adjusters as
independent contractors when: (1) the contract between the parties does
not allow for the at-will termination of the relationship without legal
consequences; (2) the insurance company does not have the right to control
the work of the adjuster; (3) the insurer controls only the result but not the
methods used to achieve it; and (4) the adjuster has the freedom to act as
the work requires.279 When independent adjusters possess more power and
more control over their work, they have more freedom in the choices made
during the performance of such work.280 An increase in adjuster autonomy
also means both an increase in responsibility and a decrease in liability for
insurers because of their lessened control over the actions of the
adjusters.281 Accordingly, courts should not impute liability to insurers for
the conduct of independent adjusters classified as independent
contractors.282

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v.
Cash Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
274. See generally Hickman, 262 So. 2d at 390 (setting forth the independentcontractor test).
275. See generally id.
276. See generally id.
277. See generally id.
278. See generally id.
279. See generally id.
280. See generally id.
281. See generally id.
282. See generally id.
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Therefore, in determining the liability of independent adjusters, their
status as either independent contractors or employees depends upon the
contract entered into between the adjuster and the insurer.283 Further,
agency law does not completely answer the question of whether courts
should hold independent adjusters individually liable or impute such
liability to insurers, as there are additional policy dynamics worth
considering, such as Louisiana’s duty-risk scheme and a cost-benefit
analysis.284
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND THE LOUISIANA DUTY-RISK APPROACH
In determining whether insurance adjusters are individually liable
when they assume a duty to the insured, courts should first consider the
Louisiana duty-risk approach and then the general policy implications of
the national majority view on this issue.285 Applying the duty-risk
approach and the policy factors used by the national majority view will
help to determine whether Louisiana’s treatment of independent-adjuster
liability falls in line with the national majority or minority view, or
somewhere in between.286 Therefore, in drafting new legislation, the
Louisiana Legislature should first examine the Louisiana-specific factors
to compare with the national scheme.287
A. Duty-Risk Approach
In Louisiana, courts use a duty-risk approach in conducting a
negligence analysis, examining not only the duty owed to the plaintiff, but
also the scope of the risk associated with that duty.288 The duty-risk
analysis examines factors such as foreseeability of harm, the ease of
association between the duty owed and the injury, and public policy289 to
283. See generally id.
284. See Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Hill v.
Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (La. 1972); Morvay v. Hanover Ins.
Cos., 506 A.2d 333, 335 (N.H. 1986); Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs.,
Inc. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 802 (Ct. App. 1999).
285. See Pitre, 530 So. 2d 1151; Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622; Morvay, 506 A.2d at
335; Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
286. Compare Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802, with Morvay, 506 A.2d at 335.
287. See Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622; Pitre, 530 So. 2d 1151; Morvay, 506 A.2d at
335; Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
288. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1052 (La. 1991).
289. See Pitre, 530 So. 2d 1151. The policy factors include: (1) deterrence of
undesirable conduct; (2) whether it is fair to compensate the victim; (3) whether
deciding the issue would open the floodgates to litigation; (4) satisfaction of the
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determine if an injury falls within the scope of the duty owed.290 In
applying the duty-risk formula to liability between adjusters and insurers,
there is an ease of association between the improper conduct of an
independent adjuster and the economic injury of the insured because of the
denial or delay of an insurance claim, and this injury is foreseeable. 291
Therefore, the duty-risk approach supports independent liability for
independent adjusters and opposes the imputation of liability from
adjusters to insurers when such adjusters owe a duty to insureds, as the
scope of the duty extends to economic injury of insureds from adjuster
misconduct.292 This conclusion aligns with the national minority view of
allowing for recovery against independent adjusters for economic injury
in the absence of contractual privity.293 As such, the duty-risk analysis
suggests that Louisiana’s treatment of independent adjusters may align
more closely with the national minority view than with the majority.294
B. Application of Policy Factors from Majority View to Louisiana
Law
There are additional policy factors, however, that are relevant in
characterizing Louisiana’s treatment of independent adjusters.295 In
addition to Louisiana-specific factors like duty-risk, it is helpful to
examine the national policy factors utilized by majority-view states in
determining whether courts should hold independent adjusters
independently liable.296 Therefore, the policy factors cited by the national
majority view, as set forth by the California Second Circuit Court of
Appeal in Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Services, Inc., are relevant
to the treatment of independent adjusters in Louisiana insofar as they
indicate whether society is willing to hold independent adjusters
independently liable.297
community’s sense of justice; (5) whether the decision would lead to efficient
administration of the law; and (6) whether the decision exercises deference to the
legislative will. Id.
290. See Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622; Pitre, 530 So. 2d 1151.
291. See Morvay, 506 A.2d at 335.
292. See Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622; Morvay, 506 A.2d at 335.
293. See Morvay, 506 A.2d at 335.
294. See id.
295. See Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799,
802 (Ct. App. 1999).
296. See generally id. (discussing the policy considerations behind a rule of no
duty for independent adjusters).
297. See generally id.
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First, examining the blameworthiness of adjuster conduct relative to
the decision-making power granted through the contractual relationship
with the insured supports the exceptions discussed in Alarcon, Dillon,
Pelican Hospitality Group, and Pellerin.298 The first factor depends
entirely upon the adjuster’s conduct; if such conduct falls within one of
the exceptions discussed by Louisiana courts, such as the self-dealing of
the adjuster in Dillon, then the adjuster likely owes a duty to the insured,
and the insurer is not liable for the adjuster’s bad acts as a matter of public
policy.299 The opposing argument is that adjusters do not have the power
to limit their liability through a contract like the insurer does; hence, the
imposition of a duty would expose them to greater liability.300 In further
support of this counterargument, insurers have contracts with both
insureds and independent adjusters.301 Thus, insurers can limit their
liability through contractual provisions, such as indemnity clauses.302
Independent adjusters, however, do not have a contract with the insured
and are therefore incapable of limiting their liability to insureds through
contractual provisions.303
Moving to the second policy factor, courts should consider whether a
duty would create conflicting obligations for the adjuster.304 It is unlikely
that imposing a duty upon adjusters when their acts are sufficient to
assume a duty under the exceptions from Louisiana case law would create
conflicting loyalties because both the adjuster and the insurer should have
the same goal: evaluating the claim in a just and equitable way.305 There
298. See Dillon v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at
*3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06618, 2006 WL 3313721, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy,
396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
299. See Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3; Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL
3313721, at *4; Alarcon, 538 So. 2d 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
300. See generally Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802 (discussing the policy
considerations behind a rule of no duty for independent adjusters).
301. See generally id.
302. See generally id.
303. See generally id.
304. PLITT & PLITT, supra note 10 (citing Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801–03).
305. See Dillon v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at
*3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06618, 2006 WL 3313721, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy,
396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981); see generally Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 802 (discussing the policy considerations behind a rule of no duty for
independent adjusters).
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is no concern of conflicting loyalty if the adjuster and insurer both follow
the statutory requirements and proper procedure in fairly evaluating a
claim.306
The third policy consideration requires an examination of all the
potential costs and benefits of a proposed rule on adjuster liability.307 The
costs of imposing a duty on independent adjusters would include an
increase in potential liability for adjusters because of the lack of a contract
with insureds to insulate themselves and a decrease in the supply of
adjusters as a result of an increased number of adjusters going in-house to
protect themselves from such liability.308 Additionally, placing liability on
independent adjusters would lead to increased premium costs because of
the need for liability insurance for independent adjusters.309 Increased
liability may also lead to a potential increase in insureds’ premiums if
adjusters pass on the cost of this new insurance to insurers hiring them.310
The majority view, however, overlooks several key benefits to the
imposition of a duty on independent adjusters.311
One of the greatest benefits is that insurance companies would save the
costs incurred while litigating claims for which they are not to blame and
while trying to recoup some of those costs from the adjuster in a subsequent
breach-of-contract action.312 Allowing recovery directly from independent
adjusters would also increase judicial efficiency by decreasing the amount
of cases heard, as insurers would no longer have to subsequently sue
independent adjusters.313 The benefits for courts and insurers are the most
important arguments for the imputation of liability for all actions of
independent adjusters because insureds do not stand to gain much benefit at
all, as they already possess a right of action against the insurance

306. See Pelican Hosp. Grp., 2006 WL 3313721, at *4; Dillon, 2006 WL
3469554, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); Alarcon, 538 So. 2d 696; Pellerin, 396
So. 2d 371; see generally Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802 (discussing the policy
considerations behind a rule of no duty for independent adjusters).
307. See generally Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802 (discussing the policy
considerations behind a rule of no duty for independent adjusters).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Compare id., with Graves, supra note 23.
312. See generally Graves, supra note 23 (discussing the policy considerations
behind Louisiana’s bad-faith insurance statutes).
313. See generally id.
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company.314 Creating a solution here, however, would establish an equitable
remedy for insurance companies and insureds alike.315
As to the fourth factor, courts must determine whether imposing such
a duty would contradict existing case law concerning insurer liability.316
The majority view provides that assigning a duty to independent adjusters
would contravene prior case law, but this is not the case in Louisiana, as
both state and federal courts there provide for situations where adjusters
may assume a duty to insureds.317 Next, the fifth factor concerns whether
the creation of an adjuster duty would lead to the judiciary overstepping
into the legislative arena.318 This factor weighs against the assignment of
a duty to independent adjusters because of the implications of such a duty
on insurance law as a result of potential new treatment of both bad-faith
and general claims against insurers, in addition to the legislature’s intent
to make the good-faith duties non-delegable.319 Therefore, a statute is the
most appropriate remedy here, as it can both concisely state the situations
in which adjusters owe a duty to insureds and definitively provide a clear
remedy for such situations.320
Finally, the sixth factor asks whether an adjuster duty would fit into
the principles of agency law.321 An application of the sixth factor
demonstrates that the imposition of a duty on independent adjusters is
consistent with agency law regardless of the classification of such
adjusters as independent contractors or agents, as Louisiana allows for the
recovery of economic loss without privity of contract.322
Therefore, an application of the majority view’s policy factors to
Louisiana law indicates that the factors are almost evenly balanced in favor
314. See generally Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802 (discussing the policy
considerations behind a rule of no duty for independent adjusters).
315. See generally id.
316. Id.
317. See Dillon v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, *3
(E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06-618,
2006 WL 3313721, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, 396
So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
318. Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
319. See Hoffman v. Ellender, No. 15-309-JWD-RLB, 2015 WL 4873342
(M.D. La. July 23, 2015); Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 05-6315, 2006 WL
3141247 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006).
320. What is the Civil Law?, LSU LAW, https://www.law.lsu.edu/clo/civil-lawonline/what-is-the-civil-law/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019) [https://perma.cc/A3G4Y4Q9].
321. Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
322. See Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007, 1014 (La. 1993).
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of and in opposition to the assignment of an independent duty to
independent adjusters.323 Thus, Louisiana does not fit squarely within
either the national majority or minority views.324 However, the issue of the
non-delegable statutory duties of insurers and the policy considerations
behind that rule remain to analyze.325
C. Bad Faith Without Bad Conduct
Even if an adjuster’s actions are knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or
without probable cause, when an insurer exercises due care in the hiring
of the adjuster and the investigation of the claim, the insurer’s behavior is
not knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.326
Therefore, penalizing insurers does not serve the policy of punishment
behind Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:1892 and § 22:1973.327 By
creating a limitation on bad-faith liability for the actions of independent
adjusters in response to this policy consideration, Louisiana would adopt
a middle-ground approach between both the majority and minority
views.328
Because of its unique nature, Louisiana does not fit squarely within
either the national majority or minority views.329 Louisiana law, however,
contains many of the necessary building blocks for addressing the liability
of independent adjusters, including the general rule that adjusters owe no
duty to insureds, the exceptions to that rule, duty-risk and the importance
of public policy factors, and the inability to delegate good-faith statutory

323. See application of majority-view policy factors to Louisiana law supra
Part IV.B.
324. See application of majority-view policy factors to Louisiana law supra
Part IV.B.
325. See Graves, supra note 23.
326. See generally id. (discussing the policy considerations behind Louisiana’s
bad-faith insurance statutes).
327. See generally id.
328. See generally id.; Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 506 A.2d 333, 335 (N.H.
1986) (finding a duty for independent adjusters); Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden
Claims Servs., Inc. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 802 (Ct. App. 1999) (discussing
majority-view policy considerations).
329. See application of policy factors and Louisiana’s duty-risk approach
supra Part IV; discussion supra Part II.B on general rule of no duty of adjusters
and exceptions; discussion supra Part II.A on non-delegable duties.
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duties.330 Therefore, as a whole, Louisiana would benefit from a hybrid
system combining elements of both the majority and minority views.331
V. AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
Ultimately, the adoption and amendment of statutes are the most
effective ways to clarify how courts should treat independent-adjuster
liability in Louisiana, as statutes provide courts with a framework to
decide cases.332 Louisiana courts have generally held that independent
insurance adjusters owe no duty to insureds.333 The law is still not fully
developed in this area, however, because of some disagreement among
Louisiana courts,334 the lack of guidance from the Louisiana Supreme
Court, and the absence of significant discussion accounting for all relevant
factors in the analysis.335 Accordingly, Louisiana courts need guidance
concerning the duties of independent adjusters.336 Therefore, the Louisiana
Legislature should adopt a statute establishing that there is no general duty
of independent and employee insurance adjusters to insureds and
enumerating the exceptions to that general rule––that is, the situations in

330. See application of policy factors and Louisiana’s duty-risk approach
supra Part IV; discussion supra Part II.B on general rule of no duty of adjusters
and exceptions; discussion supra Part II.A on non-delegable duties.
331. See application of policy factors and Louisiana’s duty-risk approach
supra Part IV; discussion supra Part II.B on general rule of no duty of adjusters
and exceptions; discussion supra Part II.A on non-delegable duties.
332. What is the Civil Law?, supra note 320.
333. See Westmoreland v. Wright Nat. Flood, No. 13-564, 2014 WL 1343387,
at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 3, 2014); St. Marie v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 068725, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007); Pellerin v. Cash
Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
334. Compare Loehn v. Hardin, No. 02-257, 2002 WL 922380, at *2 (E.D. La.
May 6, 2002), with Motin v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 03-2487, 2003 WL 22533673,
at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2003).
335. See, e.g., Westmoreland, 2014 WL 1343387, at *1; Dillon v. Lincoln Gen.
Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2006); St.
Marie, 2007 WL 1017588, at *3; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371. Although the courts in
these cases discuss exceptions to the general rule, they never fully consider all
applicable factors. The main failing is the consistent absence of agency-law
principles in the consideration.
336. See application of majority-view policy factors to Louisiana law supra
Part IV.B.
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which an adjuster can assume a duty to insureds and thus be subject to
independent liability.337 The proposed statute should read:
(A) Insurance adjusters, whether independent or employee, owe
no duty to insureds in an insurance claim. Accordingly, insurers
are liable for the acts or omissions of the independent adjusters
and employee adjusters that the insurer hires.
(B) Exceptions to the general rule:
(1) Insurance adjusters may assume an independent duty to an
insured under certain circumstances, such as:
(a) A disparity in the relative education of the parties;
(b) The diligence of the claimant in seeking the facts;
(c) The actual or apparent authority of the adjuster;
(d) The content of the adjuster’s promises to the insured;
(e) Misrepresentation;
(f) Fraud; or
(g) Self-dealing.338
(2) When the adjuster assumes a duty to the insured, it is possible
for the adjuster to be independently liable to the insured in the
event that the insurer employing or contracting with the adjuster
has no knowledge of the behavior giving rise to the assumption.
A single statute providing for no general duty of independent adjusters
with some exceptions, however, does not fully answer the question of
whether courts should then impute liability to insurers.339 If an
independent adjuster is found to owe a duty under the above statute, then
courts must determine if the independent adjuster is an independent
contractor or an employee to ultimately decide whether to impute liability
to the insurer.340
Despite the adoption of a statute regarding the duties of adjusters,
promulgating a statute that defines independent adjusters as employees or
independent contractors would not create an efficient or equitable result.341
The classification of individuals as employees or independent contractors
337. See, e.g., Westmoreland, 2014 WL 1343387, at *1; St. Marie, 2007 WL
1017588, at *3; Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
338. See generally Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371 (discussing the exceptions to the
general rule of no duty for independent adjusters); Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at
*3 (discussing the exceptions to the general rule of no duty for independent
adjusters).
339. See generally Hickman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 262 So. 2d 385, 390 (La.
1972) (setting forth the independent-contractor test).
340. See generally id.
341. See generally id.
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depends directly upon the power granted to the individuals in their contract
with their employers.342 Therefore, Louisiana courts should apply the
independent contractor factors on a case-by-case basis, weighing the effect
of each specific contract on the relationship of the parties to determine
whether any particular independent adjuster is an independent contractor
or an employee.343 A statute adopting an absolute statement definitively
categorizing independent adjusters as either employees or independent
contractors is not appropriate because it would create a far too rigid
standard, blind to the flexibility of contractual relationships between
insurance companies and independent adjusters.344 Generally, when
independent adjusters owe a duty under the statute, their liability is
imputed to the insurer when they qualify as employees, whereas their
liability is not imputed to the insurer when classified as independent
contractors.345
One of the main implications of providing for the independent liability
of independent adjusters is its effect on the applicable prescriptive
periods.346 For claims sounding in breach of contract, such as insureds’
claims against insurers for the violation of duties under Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 22:1892 and § 22:1973, a ten-year prescriptive period applies.347
Conversely, for tort-based claims against independent adjusters, insureds
would only have one year from the date of injury to file suit.348 Therefore,
by holding adjusters independently liable and not imputing such liability
to the insurer, courts will also decrease the amount of time insureds have
to file suit.349 As the applicable prescriptive period is extremely important
to all parties involved in a case, this consideration will likely heavily
influence the court’s application of the above proposed statute and
accompanying agency-law analysis.350
Additionally, the legislature should amend Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 22:1892 and § 22:1973, or draft a new statute, to clarify that insurers are
342. See generally id.
343. See generally id.
344. Id.
345. See generally id.
346. The prescriptive period is the length of time in which an insured has to
bring a claim. See Smith v. Citadel Ins. Co., 285 So. 3d 1062, 1069–70 (La. 2019).
347. Id.
348. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (2019).
349. See generally Smith, 285 So. 3d at 1069–70 (finding that statutory claims
against insurers are subject to a ten-year prescriptive period); LA. CIV. CODE art.
3492 (tort claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period); see proposed
statute and discussion of agency law supra Part V.
350. See generally Smith, 285 So. 3d at 1069–70; LA. CIV. CODE art 3492.
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not liable for actions of the independent adjuster that are knowing,
arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause when the insurer itself
exercises due care. According to Louisiana case law, the good-faith
statutory duties of insurers are non-delegable; therefore, independent
adjusters are not liable for violations of these duties.351 The practice of
penalizing only insurers for the bad-faith actions of independent adjusters,
however, creates a policy issue by punishing innocent insurer behavior.352
The Louisiana Legislature should directly address and solve this concern
by amending Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:1892 and § 22:1973.353 A
draft of such amendment should read:
Limitation of Liability. Under this section, an insurer is not liable
for penalties when the insurer can demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, affirmative acts taken on its part to ensure
that its duty of care was properly exercised and such behavior was
not knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. An
insurer is not liable for such penalties under this section when the
conduct of an independent adjuster, classified as an independent
contractor and hired by the insurer, constitutes actions that are
knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause and that
result in a breach of the insurer’s duties, unless the insurer exhibits
conduct of the same kind.
The proposed amendment to the good-faith statutes relies on the
classification of independent adjusters as independent contractors.354 In
contrast with independent-adjuster duties in general, independent adjusters
do not owe a statutory good-faith duty, so there is no liability to impute
regardless of the classification of such adjusters as independent
contractors or employees.355 Here, the only issue is whether insurers are
liable for others’ actions that are knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or without
351. See generally Hoffman v. Ellender, No. 15-209-JWD-RLB, 2015 WL
4873342 (M.D. La. July 23, 2015) (finding that insurers’ good-faith duties are
non-delegable); Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-6315, 2006 WL 3141247
(E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006) (finding that insurers’ good-faith duties are nondelegable).
352. See Graves, supra note 23.
353. Id.
354. See generally Hickman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 262 So. 2d 385, 390 (La.
1972) (setting forth the independent-contractor test).
355. See Hoffman, 2015 WL 4873342; Rosinia, 2006 WL 3141247; see also
McLin v. Breaux, 950 So. 2d 711 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006); Foster v. Destin
Trading Corp., 700 So. 2d 199, 209 (La. 1997); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So.
2d 1285, 1293 (La. 1978).
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probable cause.356 As employers are vicariously liable for the actions of
their employees and agents, insurers are liable under Revised Statutes
§ 22:1892 and § 22:1973 for actions of employees because of the level of
control exerted over their work.357 Employers do not exert as much power
and control over independent contractors; therefore, courts should not find
insurers statutorily liable for the actions of independent adjusters classified
as independent contractors that are knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or
lacking probable cause when the insurer does not violate its own duty.358
Although this proposal appears to contradict the exception to the
independent-contractor rule that employers are liable for the actions of
independent contractors for the performance of a non-delegable duty, the
contradiction is justified because the bad-faith statutes are penal in nature,
and courts should strictly construe them.359 Ultimately, such statutory
provisions in conjunction with courts’ application of the independentcontractor test would greatly assist in the efficient, economical, and
equitable resolution of disputes involving insurance companies,
independent insurance adjusters, and insureds.
CONCLUSION
The question began simply as whether to impute or not to impute, but
it developed into much more. Such a seemingly straightforward question
raised many more questions, including whether independent adjusters owe
a duty to insureds; whether such adjusters are classified as independent
contractors or employees under agency law principles; and whether public
policy reasons support independent liability for adjusters in certain
circumstances.360 The answers to each of these questions support the
imputation of liability from independent adjusters to the insurers that hired
them; however, there are some situations in which this rule does not
apply.361 In order to clarify the ambiguities surrounding the treatment of
independent-adjuster liability in Louisiana, the state legislature should
adopt a statute providing for a general rule that independent adjusters have
356. See Graves, supra note 23.
357. See generally Hickman, 262 So. 2d at 390.
358. See generally id.
359. See generally Nero v. La. Indep. Ins. Agencies, Inc., No. 03-3317, 2003
WL 203145, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2003) (finding that penal statutes must be
strictly construed); Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1294 n.16 (finding that employers are
liable for the actions of independent contractors in the performance of a nondelegable duty).
360. See discussion supra Introduction.
361. See discussion supra Parts II–IV.
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no duty and thus no independent liability to insureds.362 The statute should
also provide for some exceptions to this general rule, as outlined by the
Louisiana case law.363
Additionally, the legislature should amend Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 22:1892 and § 22:1973 to clarify that insurers are not liable for the
conduct of independent adjusters that is knowing, arbitrary, capricious, or
lacking probable cause unless the behavior of the insurer itself is knowing,
arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.364 The analysis under
these statutes, however, is not complete until courts classify the
independent adjuster as an independent contractor or an employee and thus
determine whether any liability of the independent adjuster can be imputed
to the insurer.365 Therefore, when faced with the question of whether to
impute or not to impute, the answer is not life or death, but rather impute,
with some exceptions.366

362. For a discussion of the exceptions to the general rule, see Dillon v.
Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-7354, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30,
2006); Pelican Hosp. Grp. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., No. 06-618, 2006 WL 3313721,
at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2006); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Pellerin v. Cash Pharmacy, 396 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1981).
363. For a discussion of the exceptions to the general rule, see Pelican Hosp.
Grp., 2006 WL 3313721, at *4; Dillon, 2006 WL 3469554, at *3; Alarcon, 538
So. 2d 696; Pellerin, 396 So. 2d 371.
364. See Graves, supra note 23.
365. See generally Hickman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 262 So. 2d 385, 390 (La.
1972) (setting forth the independent-contractor test).
366. For a discussion of life and death, rather than of the imputation of
insurance-adjuster liability, see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET.
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